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T he appeal of representative democracy hinges on the responsiveness of elected politicians to the preferences and interests of their constituents. Given the theoretical and practical significance of the connection between constituents' opinions and their representatives' legislative activities, it is remarkable that the large and in some ways quite sophisticated empirical literature addressing this connection includes so few direct estimates of the relationship between constituency opinion and specific legislative outcomes.1 My aim here is to provide one such estimate.
The policy issue I have chosen to examine is the level of total Pentagon spending in the first (FY 1982) defense appropriations bill of the Reagan administration. That bill, the first in a series of annual appropriations resulting in a 40% real increase in defense spending during Reagan's first five years in office, is of obvious political significance. But the issue of defense spending is also especially interesting from a broader theoretical perspective because the strong public demand for a defense spending increase at the beginning of the Reagan era provides unusual analytical leverage for assessing the potential impact of public opinion on the making of public policy.
I shall describe some alternative mechanisms of congressional responsiveness to constituency opinion; briefly characterize the politics of defense at the beginning of the Reagan era; present my analysis of representatives' preferences regarding FY 1982 defense appropriations, relating those preferences to constituency opinions on the defense spending issue and to other political characteristics of the representatives and their districts; extend the analysis of FY 1982 defense appropriations from the individual to the aggregate level in an attempt to estimate the impact of congressional responsiveness on the total level of Pentagon appropriations; and finally, touch upon some of the implications of my analysis for the study of linkages between public opinion and public policy.
Parties, Elections, and Congressional Responsiveness
How does constituency opinion get translated into public policy? The emphasis in the modern tradition of democratic thought variously encompassed by "rational choice," "responsible party," and "realist" theories has been upon the importance of electoral competition for inducing political responsiveness, either through actual partisan turnover or through anticipation by incumbents of constituents' policy demands (Downs 1957; Schattschneider 1942; Schumpeter 1950) . But for observers of the contemporary U.S. Congress, both the steady pull of prospective electoral competition and the occasional push of widespread partisan turnover have seemed tenuous mechanisms for ensuring democratic accountability. Increasingly, incumbent representatives have been returned to office reliably, overwhelmingly, and independently of broad national political currents.2 Presidential landslides have been common enough; but instead of signaling major and enduring "party realignments," those shifts at the presidential level have increasingly left Congress essentially untouched. 3 The significance of this historical trend has been stressed most forcefully by political historians raised on the major party realignments-and subsequent policy shifts-of earlier eras. Thus, Brady (1988, 181) argued that:
given the noncompetitive nature of contemporary House elections, two conditions of responsible government are difficult to meet. Presidents will not carry majorities into office with them, and there will be little alternation of or undivided control of the government. Under these conditions American government will continue to be characterized by drift rather than mastery, and by fragmentation rather than coherence.
Of the Reagan era in particular, Brady (p. 164) argued that "there was not enough turnover to create the conditions (committee changes and other shifts discussed in chapters 2-4) to change policy in a significant or permanent manner." If Brady is right-if large-scale turnover in Congress is a necessary precondition for significant policy change-then the prospects for such change do appear bleak.4 It has become increasingly difficult to envision an electoral unheaval of sufficient magnitude to produce congressional turnover on the scale of the classic "critical elections" of earlier eras.
On the other hand, perhaps we should expect incumbent representatives, both individually and collectively, to respond to significant changes in constituency opinion even when they face little real danger of being voted out of office. Within the "realist" model such behavior could be rationalized as evidence of extreme risk aversion: if representatives care only about reelection, they may be happy to bend in any breeze rather than risk a revolt in the district, however unlikely it may be. More realistically, even representatives who realize that their seats are quite safe may feel bound as a matter of duty to give some independent weight to their constituents' more fervent opinions when those opinions conflict with the representatives' own. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the same objective events that influence constituents' opinions may also influence representatives' own opinions about good policy, producing, if not responsiveness, at least congruence between the views of representatives and the views of their constituents.
My argument here is that for one or more of these reasons, even securely incumbent representatives did vigorously represent their constituents' desires for increases in defense spending in 1981. Thus, it appears that important policy changes can and do occur even in the absence of significant congressional turnover. Under current circumstances, elections seem like blunt instruments at best for ensuring congressional responsiveness; but Con-458 gress seems responsive nevertheless, and that fact is sufficiently important and intriguing to warrant sustained attention. Taken literally, much of this Republican indictment was unsupported by the facts. As Figure 1 indicates, Carter's first three defense appropriations essentially kept pace with inflation, even after some whittling down by Congress. Increasingly, however, Carter's moderate approach put him behind the curve of public (and congressional) opinion. As Figure 2 shows, a small public plurality favoring defense spending increases had emerged even before the events in Iran and Afghanistan. In the first half of 1980 that plurality grew so rapidly that throughout the campaign season, the fraction of the public favoring defense spending increases outnumbered the fraction favoring decreases by about 40 percentage points. Figure 3 to salient characteristics of the representatives and their districts.10 The characteristics whose effects are estimated in Table 1 are of three general sorts: constituency opinion, economic interests, and partisan political factors (including the representatives' own partisanship and presidential influence).
Constituency Opinion
My main interest here is in the relationship between constituency opinion and representatives' legislative behavior. One of my reasons for focusing on the specific issue of defense spending is that the 1980 NES survey included an item directly tapping constituents' opinions on that issue: "Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?" Respondents were offered a seven-point scale with the endpoints labeled greatly decrease and greatly increase. In my recoding of the raw data these endpoints correspond to scores of -3 and 3, respectively. In each congressional district my measure of constituency opinion is the mean score (based on an average of 19 individual responses) on this seven-point scale.11 It is a testament to the force of prodefense sentiment in the nation as a whole in 1980 that of the 108 congressional districts included in the NES survey, 107 had mean constituency opinions favoring defense spending increases.12
The estimated impact of that prodefense sentiment on representatives' appropriations preferences in Table 1 is quite striking. Every one-point increase or decrease in mean constituency opinion on the NES seven-point scale produced an estimated increase or decrease in congres-463 sional defense appropriations preferences of almost $13 billion. Given the observed range of district means-3.5 points on the NES seven-point scale-this estimate suggests that individual representatives' appropriations preferences varied by as much as $45 billion (over a total appropriation of less than $200 billion) due to variations in constituency preferences. By the same estimate, a difference of a bit less than half a point on the seven-point scale (one standard deviation in the distribution of district means) would be sufficient to produce a difference of $6.3 billion in appropriations preferences-the difference between the preferences of an average Democrat and an average Republican in Figure 3 . Table 1 also includes an estimate of how the impact of constituency opinion varied with the electoral competitiveness of specific congressional districts. The idea is that representatives elected by relatively narrow margins might be especially sensitive to the policy demands of their constituents. Some evidence of differential responsiveness consistent with that hypothesis does appear, but it is too slight and too imprecise to amount to much. A representative elected by the narrowest possible margin would, by this estimate, be less than 5% more responsive to constituency opinion than one elected without any opposition at all.
Economic Interests
Another obvious source of district-level variation in support for defense spending is district-level variation in the economic costs and benefits of various Pentagon activities. Other things being equal, we expect representatives-in the realm of defense spending as elsewhere-to support programs that bring their constituents contracts and salaries and to oppose programs that cost their constituents tax dollars, even when those costs and benefits are not entirely reflected in aggregate constituency opinion.
While it would obviously be very helpful to have detailed data on the economic implications of every roll call for every congressional district, readily available data are much rougher. Here, I measure each district's stake in the Pentagon budget as a whole by including among the explanatory variables a single measure of costs (annual per capita federal tax payments) and a single measure of benefits (annual per capita outlays by the Department of Defense). The roughness of the measures is exacerbated by the fact that the relevant data are available not at the level of congressional districts but at the level of states.
In spite of these difficulties, both measures have plausible estimated impacts in the analysis of defense appropriation preferences reported in Table 1 . A thousand-dollar per capita difference in annual Defense Department outlays corresponds to a $7.70-billion difference in imputed congressional preferences for FY 1982 defense appropriations, while a thousand-dollar per capita difference in tax burdens corresponds to a -$4.14 billion difference in preferred defense appropriations. These effects are especially impressive if one bears in mind that economic interests also have a substantial indirect effect on congressional preferences through their effect on constituency opinion.
Partisanship
Does it matter that the partisan division of congressional seats is considerably more stable from one election to the next than it was before 19507 Net partisan turnover is significant to the extent that Democrats and Republicans behave differently in Congress. But it is important to avoid confusing the net effect of partisanship per se with the total observed difference between Democratic and Republican 464 representatives, since much of the total difference may be attributable not to the partisanship of Democratic and Republican representatives but to the distinctive characteristics of Democratic and Republican districts. Here I attempt to characterize the real political impact of partisan turnover by estimating the effect of a representative's party affiliation on his preferred level of defense appropriations after statistically controlling for relevant characteristics of his constituency.
The estimate in Table 1 suggests that, other things being equal, Republican representatives wanted about $3.9 billion more than their Democratic counterparts in FY 1982 Pentagon appropriations. This estimate of the net effect of partisanship represents only about three-fifths of the observed $6.3 billion partisan difference in appropriations preferences in Figure 3 ; the remainder of the observed aggregate difference is attributable to the fact that Republicans tended disproportionately to represent pro-Pentagon districts and Democrats tended disproportionately to represent anti-Pentagon districts.
Presidential Influence
Students of the presidency at least since Neustadt (1960) have observed that presidents pushing for significant policy changes can succeed only if they find the political means necessary to influence the behavior of other actors. Furthermore, they have noticed that "election outcomes obviously bear upon [the president's] chances to obtain his policy ends by other means" (Neustadt 1960, 91) . For a representative, the most relevant election outcomes are presumably those in his own district; thus, the president's power to persuade should vary directly with presidential support in the representative's district and inversely with the political insulation provided by the representative's own district-level support. Thus, it seems reasonable here to measure Reagan's (potential) influence over (potentially) unwilling representatives by the extent to which his 1980 vote total in each district led or trailed the congressional winner's own vote total.
It is an interesting comment on the relative electoral security of most representatives that Reagan's victory left him well behind the winning congressional candidate-Democratic or Republican-in most districts.'4 The estimated effect in Table 1 It is impossible to estimate precisely the magnitude of the underestimation resulting from these various factors. However, it does seem clear that the increase in appropriations attributed to constituency opinion in Table 2 Table 2 ignore both errors of model specification and estimation"' and other influences on congressional behavior; nevertheless, the coincidence should give some pause to those who would prefer on ideological grounds to view defense spending in general, and the Reagan defense buildup in particular, as fundamentally undemocratic phenomena.
Conclusion
The analysis presented suggests that public opinion was a powerful force for policy change in the realm of defense spending in the first year of the Reagan administration. Moreover, the impact of constituency opinion appears to have been remarkably broad-based, influencing all sorts of representatives across a wide spectrum of specific defense spending issues. 19 Whether constituency opinion has a similar impact on congressional policy making in other issue areas and under other political circumstances is, of course, an open question. For all its volume and apparent sophistication, the empirical literature on representation does little to help answer that question.20 Certainly, aggregate changes in public opinion of the magnitude and salience observed on the defense spending issue in the late 1970s are rare.21 But at this point we simply know too little to be able to guess with any confidence whether the effect of less dramatic constituency demands for policy change are likely to be proportional to their magnitude, their intensity, their specific source, or some complicated combination of all three.
To the extent that the analysis reported here does turn out to be representative of other times and other issues, it suggests, contrary to some accounts, that Congress can produce substantial policy changes even in the absence of significant turnover. Given the fickle and fragmentary nature of public opinion on many issues, these policy changes may seldom be 467 sweeping or sustained; certainly the public and Congress alike cooled markedly in their enthusiasm for defense spending even by the end of 1981. But then, a policy realignment of the classic sort may not be so desirable after all if it merely serves to preserve and exaggerate a temporary public enthusiasm in the legislature.
The analysis presented here also suggests (though it does not conclusively demonstrate) that congressional responsiveness depends on a more complex mixture of motives than is typically assumed in the scholarly literature. The allure of a simple assumption about motivationthat elected officials respond to their constituents in order to maximize their own chances for reelection-is obvious. But the practical limitations of that assumption should also be obvious when, as here, representatives who win with 100% of the vote appear to be about as responsive to constituency opinion as those who win with 51% of the vote. Either subjective safeness bears no relationship to objective safeness (e.g., because representatives are risk-averse to the point of total spinelessness) or (as seems more likely) the reelection motive must be thought of as only one-albeit an important-element in a broader array of congressional Because the estimated constituency means contain substantial sampling error, ordinary regression analyses employing constituency opinion as an explanatory variable will produce inconsistent parameter estimates. The correction employed here is based on a purging regression relating the mean constituency opinion in each district to a variety of other (by assumption exogenous) district characteristics. Because the magnitude of the sampling error varies across districts, each district is weighted in the purging regression by the reciprocal of the standard error of the estimated district mean constituency opinion. (Thus, districts with more survey respondents get more weight in the purging regression.)
The results of the purging regression are reported in Table A standard error of the regression suggests that the purging is quite efficient.24
Imputing Congressional Preferences
The method used here to estimate representatives' preferred levels of defense appropriations is essentially that set out by Krehbiel and Rivers (1988) . We observe representatives' votes on a sequence of three roll calls offering alternative levels of total defense appropriations for FY 1982. The first vote (Congressional Quarterly roll call #302, 18 November 1981) was on an amendment to the appropriations bill proposing to cut 2% from funds appropriated for weapons procurement and research and development;25 the second vote (Congressional Quarterly roll call #303, 18 November 1981) was on the 7. These amendments focused sometimes on total dollar amounts, sometimes on specific weapons programs, and sometimes on proposals to reform Pentagon procedures. Many were offered by staunch liberals (notably Patricia Schroeder, Democrat, Colorado); the few that were eventually adopted were offered by moderates from both parties. 10. Both the estimated preferences shown in Figure 3 and the estimated effects of district characteristics shown in Table 1 are based on the probit analysis ("including competitiveness") reported in Table A-2 in the Appendix. 11. Several analysts (e.g., Achen 1978; Converse and Pierce 1986; Rivers n.d.) have attempted with some success to distinguish the impact of different constituents' opinions on representatives' behavior. Thus, the views of partisan supporters may be weighted more heavily than those of partisan opponents, or representatives may be most responsive to wealthier, more educated, and more politically active constituents. By contrast, my focus here on the mean constituency opinion in each district implies that representatives treat all constituents' views as equally relevant. This simplification is imposed in part for theoretical reasons (to approximate the ideal of responsiveness suggested by democratic theory) and in part because of data limitations (especially the relatively small number of individual respondents in each district).
12. The single exception is Charles Rangel (Democrat, New York), whose estimated constituency mean on the NES defense spending scale (based on eight responses) was -1.25; the other 107 estimated constituency means ranged from .14 to 2.25. Omitting Rangel from the analysis would leave all of the results essentially unchanged.
13. Although no full-scale analysis of the sources of constituency support for defense spending is offered here, the purging regression reported in Table  A -1 in the Appendix combined with the estimated effect of constituency opinion in Table 1 suggests that these indirect effects of economic interests are on the order of $4 billion for a thousand-dollar per capita difference in Defense Department outlays and -$6 billion for a thousand-dollar per capita difference in federal tax payments, making the total effects in each case on the order of $10-12 billion.
14. 19. In order to test the scope of congressional representation across a range of more specific defense issues, I replicated the analysis described earlier for 25 additional House roll call votes-all of the votes on defense issues in 1981 that appeared to have any significant budgetary implications. A detailed description of this supplementary analysis is omitted here but is available upon request. The most notable finding is that constituency opinion had significant effects on roll call votes across the whole spectrum of defense spending decisions, whether they involved specific weapons programs, military construction projects, or Pentagon purchasing procedures. On 22 of the 25 roll calls, however arcane the specific policy at issue, representatives' votes were 472 strongly and positively related to the positions of their constituents on the NES defense spending scale. This fact seems to confirm the appropriateness of thinking about "defense policy" (or at least "defense budget policy") as a unitary dimension; it also emphasizes the very considerable scope of congressional responsiveness to variations in relevant district opinion. 20. A notable exception to this generalization is the recent work by Jackson and King (1989) on tax policy, which is similar in its aims-and in many of its qualitative conclusions-to the work reported here.
21. Since the early 1970s the GSS has regularly measured public opinion favoring increases or decreases in government spending not only on defense but also on space exploration, foreign aid, education, environmental protection, national health, the problems of big cities, crime, drug addiction, welfare, and the condition of blacks. None of the other issue areas has seen a change in aggregate opinion approaching in magnitude the change shown for the defense spending issue in Figure 2 . For these and other relevant data, see Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989.
22. An influential typology of representatives' goals and an analysis of the consequences of those goals for congressional behavior was provided by Fenno (1973) .
23. The same districts were included in the 1978 NES, but defense spending was not among the issues constituents were asked about in 1978.
24. The standard error of this weighted regression due to measurement error alone would be 1.00; thus, the error introduced by purging amounts only to an additional 12%.
25. The vote was on Roukema's (Republican, New Jersey) substitute for Schroeder's (Democrat, Colorado) amendment proposing to reduce the appropriations for procurement, research and development, and testing and evaluation. Roukema's substitute proposed a 2% cut rather than the 5% cut proposed in Schroeder's amendment; it also exempted funds for procurement of spare parts, repair parts, and ammunition. The relevant actors seem to have assumed that Schroeder's amendment itself would fail (as it eventually did by voice vote), making the real alternative to the Roukema substitute the level of appropriations in the unamended bill. Both the announced position of the administration in opposition to Roukema's substitute and the observed pattern of support and opposition in the House lend support to this interpretation.
26. Obviously, n. 25 indicates that voting on the Roukema substitute was in fact strategic; but if my interpretation is correct, it was strategic voting of a straightforward (and readily incorporated) sort. There is no other indication of strategic voting in the roll call data. Given my interpretation in the text of the Roukema vote, four of the eight possible patterns of votes on the three separate roll calls are consistent with the assumption of single-peaked preferences over a single underlying dimension of preferred defense appropriations levels (and thus with the approach taken here of estimating unobserved ideal points by reference to observed threshold values). Each of the 96 congressmen in the NES sample who participated in all three of the relevant roll calls displayed one of these four consistent voting patterns.
27. The interaction between constituency opinion and electoral competitiveness, like constituency opinion itself, is treated here as endogenous. The corresponding regressor in the analysis reported in Table A -2, col. 2 is based on a weighted purging regression paralleling the weighted purging regression for constituency opinion shown in Table A-1. An unweighted version of the purging regression produced similar results.
28. We have a system of equations in which three pieces of information (the threshold values in Table  A -2) can be used to solve for three unknowns (the intercept and slope of the equation relating probit scores to dollar amounts and the implicit reversion level Q). In Krehbiel and Rivers 1988 the reversion level is taken as given; here there is no obviously reasonable assumption about the final outcome, given the failure of either the appropriations bill or the conference report.
29. Spending preferences were imputed to each representative by multiplying the representatives' probit score (calculated using the probit parameter estimates in Table A Table A -2 using the system of equations referred to in n. 28.)
